United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

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The appl	lication is based or	these facts:					
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Pursuant to Fed	, R. Crim. P. 4.1, thi	s warrant is presented;	✓ by relia	able electronic	means; or:	telephonically recorded	1.
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J. Richard Creatura, United States Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

City and state: Tacoma, Washington

Attachment A PROPERTY TO BE SEARCHED

This warrant applies to information associated with Instagram account "itssdree_" (active on, but not limited to, January 17, 2021), that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Facebook, Inc., a company headquartered at 1601 Willow Road, Menlo Park, California.

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ATTACHMENT B

(ITEMS TO BE SEARCHED AND SEIZED)

I. Information to be disclosed by Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook")

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of Facebook, regardless of whether such information is located within or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that has been deleted but is still available to Facebook, or has been preserved pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) on January 18, 2022, Facebook is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- A. All business records and subscriber information, in any form kept, pertaining to the Account, including:
 - 1. Identity and contact information (past and current), including full name, e-mail addresses, physical address, date of birth, phone numbers, gender, hometown, occupation, websites, and other personal identifiers;
 - 2. All Instagram usernames (past and current) and the date and time each username was active, all associated Instagram and Facebook accounts (including those linked by machine cookie), and all records or other information about connections with Facebook, third-party websites, and mobile apps (whether active, expired, or removed);
 - 3. Length of service (including start date), types of services utilized, purchases, and means and sources of payment (including any credit card or bank account number) and billing records;
 - 4. Devices used to login to or access the account, including all device identifiers, attributes, user agent strings, and information about networks and connections, cookies, operating systems, and apps and web browsers;
 - 5. All advertising information, including advertising IDs, ad activity, and ad topic preferences;
 - 6. Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses used to create, login, and use the account, including associated dates, times, and port numbers, from January 1, 2021 to present;

- 7. Privacy and account settings, including change history; and
- 8. Communications between Facebook and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken;
- B. All content (whether created, uploaded, or shared by or with the Account), records, and other information relating to videos (including live videos and videos on IGTV), images, stories and archived stories, past and current bios and profiles, posts and archived posts, captions, tags, nametags, comments, mentions, likes, follows, followed hashtags, shares, invitations, and all associated logs and metadata, January 1, 2021 to present;
- C. All content, records, and other information relating to communications sent from or received by the Account January 1, 2021 to present;, including but not limited to:
 - 1. The content of all communications sent from or received by the Account, including direct and group messages, and all associated multimedia and metadata, including deleted and draft content if available;
 - 2. All records and other information about direct, group, and disappearing messages sent from or received by the Account, including dates and times, methods, sources and destinations (including usernames and account numbers), and status (such as delivered, opened, replayed, screenshot);
 - 3. All records and other information about group conversations and video chats, including dates and times, durations, invitations, and participants (including usernames, account numbers, and date and time of entry and exit); and
 - 4. All associated logs and metadata;
- D. All content, records, and other information relating to all other interactions between the Account and other Instagram users January 1, 2021 to present, including but not limited to:
 - 1. Interactions by other Instagram users with the Account or its content, including posts, comments, likes, tags, follows (including unfollows, approved and denied follow requests, and blocks and unblocks), shares, invitations, and mentions;
 - 2. All users the account has followed (including the close friends list), unfollowed, blocked, unblocked, muted, restricted, or denied a request to follow, and of users who have followed, unfollowed, blocked, unblocked, muted, restricted, or denied a request to follow the account;

1	AFFIDAVIT
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3	STATE OF WASHINGTON)
4) ss
5	COUNTY OF PIERCE)
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7	I, Steven Meyer, being duly sworn on oath, depose and state:
8	INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
9	1. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant for
10	information associated with "itssdree_" that is stored at premises owned, maintained,
11	controlled, or operated by Instagram, LLC ("Instagram") a social-networking company
12	owned by Facebook, Inc., headquartered in Menlo Park, California. This account is
13	referred to as the "SUBJECT ACCOUNT". For the reasons set forth below, the
14	SUBJECT ACCOUNT is suspected to have been utilized by Andre Lamount
15	JACKSON to communicate about his unlawful distribution of narcotics and alien
16	smuggling through various means, including messaging with associates and advertising
17	with pictures.
18	2. The SUBJECT ACCOUNT to be searched is described in the following
19	paragraphs and in Attachment A. This affidavit is made in support of an application for a
20	search warrant under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A), and (c)(1)(A), to require
21	Instagram/Facebook, Inc. to disclose to the government records and other information in
22	its possession, including the contents of communications, pertaining to the subscriber or
23	customer associated with the SUBJECT ACCOUNT.
24	3. I am an "investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States"
25	within the meaning of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2510(7). Specifically, I am a
26	Special Agent with the DEA, and have been since March 2017. I am currently assigned
27	to the Seattle Field Division, Tacoma Resident Office. Prior to my employment with the

28 DEA, I worked as a Uniformed Officer with the Secret Service in Washington, D. C.

from June 2006 to April 2009. I received formal training at the DEA Basic Agent Training in Quantico, Virginia. The four-month Basic Academy included comprehensive, formalized instruction in, among other things: basic narcotic investigations, drug identification and detection, familiarization with United States narcotics laws, financial investigations and money laundering, identification and seizure of drug-related assets, organized crime investigations, physical and electronic surveillance, and undercover operations.

4. During the course of my law enforcement career, I have been involved in investigations of numerous criminal offenses, including the offenses involved in the current investigation. I have participated in criminal investigations of illicit drug trafficking organizations, ranging from street-level dealers to major dealers, to include Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations. These investigations have also included the unlawful importation, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of controlled substances; the related laundering of monetary instruments; the conducting of monetary transactions involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activities; and conspiracies associated with criminal narcotics offenses. These investigations have included use of the following investigative techniques: confidential informants; undercover agents; analysis of pen register, trap and trace, and toll records; physical and electronic surveillance; wiretaps; and the execution of search warrants. I have had the opportunity to monitor, listen to, and review transcripts and line sheets (prepared by linguists) documenting the content of intercepted conversations involving the trafficking of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and other narcotics, by persons who used some form of code to thwart law enforcement. I have also interviewed defendants at the time of their arrests and have debriefed, spoken with, or interviewed numerous drug dealers or confidential sources (informants) at proffer interviews who were experienced in speaking in coded conversations over the telephone. I have gained knowledge regarding the various methods, techniques, codes, and/or jargon used by drug traffickers in the course of their criminal activities, including their use of cellular telephones and

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other electronic devices to facilitate communications while avoiding law enforcement scrutiny.

- 5. I have authored, planned, and participated in the execution of search warrants authorizing the search of locations associated with drug traffickers and their coconspirators, such as residences, businesses, storage facilities, and vehicles.

 Additionally, I have authored and supervised the execution of dozens of tracking warrants, including multiple federal tracking warrant affidavits for vehicles and cellular telephones. I have testified at grand jury proceedings and written reports in the course of investigations. These investigations have resulted in numerous state and federal prosecutions of individuals who have possessed, imported, or distributed controlled substances, including methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, suspected fentanyl pills, as well as the seizure of those illegal drugs and the proceeds from their sale.
- 6. This affidavit is made based upon my personal knowledge, training, experience and investigation, as well as upon information provided to me and my review of reports prepared by other law enforcement personnel. This affidavit is made for the purpose of establishing probable cause and thus does not include each and every fact known to me concerning this investigation.
- 7. Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) § 846 (Distribution and Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute and Conspiracy to do the same) and 8 USC 1324 (alien smuggling) have been committed by Andre JACKSON. There is also probable cause to search the **SUBJECT ACCOUNT**, described in Attachments A, for evidence of these crimes and items to be seized, as listed in Attachment B.

JURISDICTION

8. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested warrant because it is "a court of competent jurisdiction" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a),

(b)(1)(A), & (c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Court is "a district court of the United States . . . that has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated." $18 \text{ U.S.C.} \ 2711(3)(A)(i)$.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- 9. In this investigation, law enforcement has received information from a Confidential Source (CS). The CS is a reliable confidential source currently working with HSI to receive favorable consideration for pending state charges relating to transportation and possession of multiple-pound quantities of narcotics. Immediately upon his/her arrest, the CS admitted responsibility for his/her actions and began providing information which has been corroborated by numerous law enforcement officers. The CS has provided information to agents regarding numerous drug trafficking organizations, money laundering organizations and individuals involved in other criminal activities. Agents have been able to corroborate identities, phone numbers and social media accounts associated with these individuals that were provided by the CS.
- 10. Per the CS's statements, the CS has worked for a drug trafficking organization (DTO) operating in Washington State and told agents that he/she has transported drugs and bulk currency for this drug trafficking organization. Based on the responsibilities the CS was tasked with by DTO members, I believe the CS is highly trusted by high-ranking DTO members and by other individuals involved in drug trafficking whom he/she has worked with in the past. The CS has provided detail on the operations of the DTO in Washington State, including concealment and transportation methods, money laundering activities, and the use of cellular telephones by DTO members. This information is consistent with investigators' knowledge of techniques employed by similar DTOs. The CS further described how drugs were distributed once they were trafficked from California, how money was transported to California and laundered to Mexico, and the "seasons" when Mexico-based DTOs operated. This information has also been validated by investigators. The CS provided addresses associated with DTO activity, including the address of a legitimate business utilized by multiple DTOs to launder and smuggle bulk cash to Mexico. After the CS provided this

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- 11. Pursuant to the CS's consent, law enforcement extracted data from the CS's cellular phone. Agents have reviewed this information, to include photographs and private messages, and determined that it is consistent with the information the CS provided, and with law enforcement's knowledge of the investigated activity. This further leads me to believe the CS has an extensive basis of knowledge and has been forthcoming with investigators.
- 12. Agents are in regular contact with the CS, and the CS has continued to provide information about members of DTOs in Washington State and the TCO that is the subject of this Affidavit. The CS has been advised that any false information given to investigators will void any agreement the CS has with HSI. To my knowledge, the CS has never provided false information to his/her controlling agents or any other law enforcement entities.
- 13. The CS's criminal history includes one arrest in California for two misdemeanor offenses. These charges were dismissed. The CS has been actively participating in this investigation since approximately mid-2021. As stated above, information provided by the CS since then has been corroborated through records checks, a controlled purchase, surveillance operations, and call record analysis, and through findings from independent federal investigations

STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

A. Background regarding Andre JACKSON

14. In July of 2021, HSI and the Seattle Police Department (SPD) began conducting a criminal investigation of a transnational criminal organization (TCO) operating out of Tijuana, Mexico with ties to Arizona, California, and Washington State,

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regarding possible violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Investigators believed this TCO and its members, including JACKSON, were responsible for distributing methamphetamine and pills containing fentanyl, a potentially deadly narcotic, in the Western District of Washington. In September of 2021, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) joined HSI and SPD in their investigation

- 15. During the investigation, the CS has provided agents information about an individual in Mexico operating a TCO with ties to Washington State. The CS referred to this individual as "La Rana," Spanish for "the frog." According to the CS, La Rana coordinates the trafficking of narcotics and other illicit merchandise from Mexico to stash houses in the United States. Per the CS, La Rana directs couriers who transport narcotics from stash houses located in Arizona and California to northern states including Washington. Agents have witnessed calls between the CS and La Rana via phone number 52-653-115-3146, a number based in Mexico, (hereinafter "the La Rana Phone"), in which La Rana discussed his drug distribution operation, including details of types and quantities of narcotics he could provide to the CS and the pricing of various narcotics. In these conversations La Rana also discussed manufacturing operations including methamphetamine laboratories and gave the CS the rates he would pay individuals smuggling narcotics across the US/Mexico border and transporting drugs within the United States. These conversations were in Spanish but were translated for agents by an HSI employee fluent in the Spanish language.
- 16. In August 2021, investigators utilized the CS to arrange a controlled purchase of counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl from Andre JACKSON, a courier working for La Rana. The CS arranged the controlled buy with La Rana and JACKSON by phone calls to the La Rana Phone and Target Telephone 2 (TT2) (Jackson's phone). Through this controlled buy—a total of approximately 392 gross grams of suspected fentanyl-laced pills in packaging material (estimated to be 3,500 pills) were acquired from JACKSON.

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- 17. During the controlled buy, JACKSON was observed in a silver Dodge 1 2 Challenger bearing California plate 8TQL397 and registered to Brenda Michelle 3 ALVAREZ-Leyva at 442 South Alexandria Avenue, Apt 2, Los Angeles, California. 4 Later that day, surveillance units observed JACKSON, in the Challenger, conduct an additional suspected drug transaction with Ashley McClure at the Winco Foods at 4969 5 6 Kitsap Way, Bremerton, Washington 98312. McClure was observed in a white Volvo 7 850 bearing Washington plate BXY3563. During their interaction, agents observed 8 McClure exit the Volvo and walk to the driver's side of the Challenger and interact with JACKSON through the driver's window, while JACKSON remained in the driver's seat of the vehicle with the doors closed. They interacted briefly, then McClure returned to 10 11 the Volvo. Shortly thereafter, both vehicles departed the area. Based on my training and 12 experience, I believe this interaction was consistent with a "hand-to-hand" drug 13 transaction.
 - 18. Between September 2021 and December 2021, agents observed JACKSON, with an associate identified as Zaina Issa SUNNA, travel from the vicinity of Los Angeles, California, to western Washington multiple times to conduct suspected drug transactions.
 - 19. On September 24, 2021, at approximately 12:50 p.m., agents observed JACKSON and SUNNA meet with McClure again at the Winco's in Bremerton. Agents observed JACKSON and SUNNA arrive in a silver VW Jetta, California plate 6ZJD348, and McClure arrive in the Volvo. Following that, agents observed McClure exit the driver's seat of the Volvo with a black backpack that appeared to be empty based on the shape of the bag and the ease with which McClure carried it. Surveillance units then observed McClure greet JACKSON and SUNNA. SUNNA appeared to direct McClure into the rear passenger seat of the Jetta. Agents observed that all parties remained in the Jetta for several minutes. McClure exited the rear passenger seat with the same backpack, which now appeared to be full. Agents noted that the backpack now appeared to be more rounded in shape and heavier, based on the way McClure had to sling it over

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her shoulder to carry it. Surveillance units watched McClure place the backpack on the front passenger's seat of her vehicle and walk around the front of the Volvo to access the driver's seat. Shortly thereafter, both vehicles departed the area. Based on my training and experience, and surveillance observations, I believed that JACKSON and SUNNA conducted a drug transaction with McClure.

- 20. On December 1, 2021, location information on JACKSON's phone indicated that he had returned to Washington. At approximately 9:30 a.m., agents established surveillance at the Gig Harbor Best Western hotel in order to identify JACKSON. Shortly thereafter, agents observed SUNNA exit the hotel and place items in the Jetta, before returning to the hotel. Agents later observed SUNNA leave the hotel driving the Jetta and stop at several locations in the area, including a marijuana store and a thrift store, before returning to the Gig Harbor Best Western Hotel.
- 21. At approximately 12:06 PM, agents observed SUNNA and JACKSON exit the hotel. Agents observed JACKSON load a green suitcase, a black backpack and a gray bag into the back passenger seat of the Jetta. SUNNA affixed a bike to the bike rack on the back of the Jetta. Agents observed SUNNA get into the passenger's seat of the Jetta and JACKSON enter the driver's seat. Agents then followed the Jetta to several locations including a Burger King and a gas station in Gig Harbor before the Jetta arrived at the Lowe's Home Improvement store located at 150 SW Sedgwick Road, Port Orchard, Washington, 98367 at approximately 12:56 PM and parked in the lot. Both SUNNA and JACKSON remained inside the vehicle for several minutes. Agents then observed SUNNA get out of the Jetta, walk around the parking lot, and reenter the car several minutes later.
- At approximately 1:14 PM, agents observed an unidentified white male on 22. a black motorcycle arrive and park in the Lowe's lot, dismount, and then walk to the Jetta. The motorcycle driver had goatee facial hair and was wearing a beanie hat. This individual entered the rear passenger's seat of the Jetta, with SUNNA and JACKSON still inside. At approximately 1:19 PM, the motorcycle driver exited the Jetta and drove

his motorcycle away. Based on my training and experience, I believe this interaction was consistent with a "hand-to-hand" drug transaction.

B. JACKSON's Use of Instagram & Involvement in Alien Smuggling

- 23. Agents are familiar with JACKSON'S appearance through previous investigations and by reviewing his photograph in the California driver's licensing (DOL) database. Investigators determined that JACKSON had an Instagram user account of "itssdree_ (SUBJECT ACCOUNT)." Investigation into the account showed that JACKSON's photograph was featured in multiple posts. Agents also learned that JACKSON had multiple photos of the silver Dodge Challenger observed at the controlled buy between the CS and JACKSON in August 2021. Additionally, agents observed that JACKSON was associated with the #LynchMobb on Instagram. The #LynchMobb is believed to be a street racer/car club group out of Los Angeles (where agents believe JACKSON lived).
- June 8, 2020 Arrest of Destiny Marissa LOMELI.

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24. On June 8, 2020, at approximately 6:05 a.m., agents with the United States Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) were performing interdiction duties at the Campo Border Patrol Station in Campo, California and observed a black Infiniti, California license 8PAX872, approaching the location. Shortly thereafter, agents moved into the flow of traffic and pulled next to the vehicle. As a result of this action, the Infiniti quickly veered onto the shoulder of the road. Following that, agents conducted a vehicle stop on the Infiniti. Agents approached the vehicle and identified four passengers, which they subsequently conducted immigration inspections on. All four individuals – later identified as Rosa GARCIA-Castillo, Gerardo Cesar GONZALES, Alejo RAMIREZ-Martinez, and Efrain VASQUEZ-HERNANDEZ – stated that they were citizens of Mexico illegally present in the United States. Agents then asked the driver of the vehicle, identified as Destiny Marissa LOMELI, what country she was a citizen of and she responded "U.S." A short time later, agents placed all four passengers under arrest for

being illegally in the United States under title 42 and placed LOMELI under arrest for 8 USC 1324 alien smuggling. The vehicle was also seized as a smuggling conveyance.

- 25. At approximately 7:55 a.m., CBP agents conducted a post-arrest interview of LOMELI. They presented her with a CBP "Consent to Search cell phone" form which she acknowledged and gave consent to. Following that, they read her a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) "Notification of Right" form (English language version). LOMELI stated she understood her rights and agreed to answer questions without the presence of an attorney. During the subsequent interview, LOMELI stated that she was instructed by an individual named "Dre", at cell phone number 424-200-2274, to pick up illegal aliens at two separate locations and take them to a hotel in Brawley, California. LOMELI stated that she knew "Dre" through friends. Homeland Security Investigators (HSI) investigators were later able to identify "Dre" as Andre Lamount JACKSON based on phone records for 424-200-2274 that showed JACKSON as the registered owner of the phone.
- November 11, 2020 Arrest of Cindy LARIOS.

- 26. On November 11, 2020, at approximately 7:04 p.m., Cindy LARIOS applied for admission into the United States from Mexico at the San Ysidro, California Port of Entry. LARIOS was driving a black KIA Sorrento, California license 7VOE380. LARIOS informed CBP agents that she was a U.S. citizen traveling to Los Angeles, California, and had nothing to declare. Shortly thereafter, CBP agents conducted an inspection of the vehicles cargo area and uncovered two individuals. During a secondary inspection, both undocumented individuals admitted they were from Mexico without the legal documentation to enter the United States. LARIOS stated that she was not paid by either undocumented individuals and acknowledged that she was aware of the two people inside the vehicle and knew it was illegal to bring people into the United States.
- 27. Following the arrest of LARIOS, officers with the San Diego Field Office Intelligence Division/Criminal Enforcement section interviewed her. During the interview, LARIOS stated that she initially met the smuggler via Instagram after she

requested money online. She obtained a response from a follower who she claimed she had never met under the name Damani 24 offering her the job. Damani 24 advised LARIOS to reach out to JACKSON, referred to as "Dre", who was under the **SUBJECT ACCOUNT** on Instagram. LARIOS told agents that JACKSON started chatting with her under WhatsApp with phone number 424-200-2274. LARIOS said JACKSON told her the job would consist of smuggling humans across the border. If successful, the job would pay \$1,000 dollars per person. LARIOS said she agreed to fit four people in her trunk. Following that, LARIOS said JACKSON told her to come down to 415 Parkway Plaza, El Cajon. Upon her arrival at that location, LARIOS said she met with JACKSON who told her that she would have to drive to Mexico and go to the Calle Coronado 400, Playas de Rosarito to pick up the people. LARIOS said she arrived at that location and JACKSON contacted her and asked her to meet him at a hotel in front of a Soriana supermarket. When she arrived at the hotel, she met with two unidentified males and the two females that she attempted to smuggle into the United States. The unidentified males placed the females into the vehicle and instructed LARIOS to drive to the border and contact them when she had crossed.

- 28. Agents conducted a search of the **SUBJECT ACCOUNT** and confirmed that Damani_24 was a current follower as of January 18, 2022.
- December 23, 2020 Arrest of Aunjae VICK.

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29. On December 23, 2020, at approximately 6:50 a.m., CBP agents observed a black car, California license 8TAA083, parked on the right shoulder of Old Highway 80. Agents observed a dark clothed individual run down the berm on the side of Old Highway 80, then open the back passenger's door, and lay down on the seat. Agents pulled behind the vehicle, activated overhead lights, and requested backup. Shortly thereafter, backup units arrived, agents approached the vehicle and observed two individuals laying down in the backseat trying to conceal themselves under a cardboard box. Once in close proximity to the vehicle, agents identified themselves to all the individuals and questioned the two under the cardboard box as to their citizenship. Both

- 30. Later that day, agents identified the driver as Aunjae Emoni VICK and advised her of her Miranda Rights at approximately 8:30 a.m. VICK elected to speak with agents without an attorney present. VICK also gave consent to search her phone, as noted on a phone consent form. VICK told agents that she was born in Los Angeles but currently lived in Las Vegas, Nevada with her boyfriend. VICK claimed that at 3:00 a.m. on December 23, 2020, an individual known as "Dre" contacted her to make a pick up in the area of Jacumba, California. VICK said she had smuggled one other time for "Dre" and was paid five hundred dollars for each individual she picked up. VICK said the prior time she picked up one individual and took them to Los Angeles. VICK said "Dre" and his girlfriend took the individual in a white Mustang SRT and paid VICK five hundred dollars. Based on the information provided by VICK, agents believed that "Dre" was JACKSON and conducted a search of the SUBJECT ACCOUNT to identify vehicles similar to what VICK had described. The result revealed pictures of a 2016 Ford Mustang, California license 8KSV046, registered to Brenda Michelle ALVAREZ-Leyva. Agents believed that ALVAREZ was the unidentified girlfriend of JACKSON who VICK observed during their meeting in Los Angeles. January 17, 2021, Arrest of Christopher ORTEGA-Almaraz.
- 31. On January 17, 2021, Border Patrol agents were conducting antismuggling operations in the Boulevard Border Patrol Area of Responsibility which is southeast San Diego County and immediately north of the United States/Mexico International Border.
- 32. At approximately 11:35 a.m., agents observed two individuals get into a silver SUV. Approximately twenty seconds later, agents observed a silver Dodge Journey, California license 8KSX155, driving west on Highway 80. Agents observed two individuals in the back of the vehicle lower their heads. Agents began following the

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vehicle as it traveled approximately forty miles per hour. Shortly thereafter, a marked Border Patrol vehicle pulled behind the Journey and activated the vehicles emergency lights and siren. The driver of the Journey, later identified as Christopher ORTEGA-Almaraz, accelerated his vehicle too approximately ninety four miles per hour. Agents pursued the Journey for a short time and then observed the vehicle pull over. Following that, agents pulled over and approached the vehicle. They identified themselves and asked ORTEGA his citizenship, to which he responded that he was a United States citizen. Following that, agents addressed the two occupants in the rear of the vehicle, later identified as Jaime HERNANDEZ-Manuel and Yony MATILALA-Espinoza, as to their country of citizenship. HERNANDEZ and MATILALA stated they were citizens of Mexico and did not have proper valid immigration documentation that would allow them to enter or remain in the United States legally. Shortly thereafter, agents placed HERNANDEZ and MATILALA under arrest for being in the United States illegally and ORTEGA under arrest for 8 USC 1324 Alien Smuggling. The subjects and vehicle were transported to the Boulevard Border Patrol Station in Boulevard, California.

33. At approximately 12:55 p.m., agents conducted a post arrest interview of ORTEGA at the Boulevard Border Patrol Station. ORTEGA was advised that the interview was being recorded by audio and video, to which he replied that he understood. Agents presented ORTEGA with consent to search cell phone forms, which ORTEGA initially declined to sign. Agents also read and explained ORTEGA his Miranda Rights and ORTEGA indicated that he understood his rights and declined to speak at that time. Following that, agents terminated the interview. However, after casework was completed and ORTEGA was going to be released, ORTEGA stated he wanted to give a statement to agents. ORTEGA was reminded of his Miranda Rights and still wanted to speak with agents. ORTEGA also gave consent to search his phone. During the subsequent interview, ORTEGA said his initial contact was through Instagram with a contact named Gassing_LA who had posted about making money as a driver. After messaging with Gassing_LA, ORTEGA was directed to the SUBJECT ACCOUNT. ORTEGA said

1	when he communicated on the SUBJECT ACCOUNT that he was instructed to
2	download WhatsApp and given a contact number of 424-200-2274. Following that,
3	ORTEGA said he met with JACKSON and an unidentified female. ORTEGA said
4	JACKSON was in a 2000ish black Camaro and the female was in a gray Challenger.
5	ORTEGA said he was told that he would get a thousand dollars for both individuals.
6	ORTEGA also said he had conversations with JACKSON regarding using dark tint to
7	conceal individuals and even putting them in the trunk. Agents identified and
8	photographed communications that ORTEGA had with JACKSON on the SUBJECT
9	ACCOUNT.

34. Based on my training and experience, previous HSI investigations, and research conducted on the **SUBJECT ACCOUNT**, I believe that JACKSON uses it to conduct illegal activity, to include drug distribution and alien smuggling. I further believe that a search warrant into the contents of the account would reveal evidence of this activity.

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND REGARDING INSTAGRAM

- 35. I know from my training and experience that social media records such as those held by Instagram may support evidence of current, on-going, future, and past criminal activity. I know that such information may be used to identify victims, witnesses, associates and co-conspirators. From my review of publicly available information provided by Instagram about its service, including Instagram's "Terms of Use" policy, "Data" policy, and "Information for Law Enforcement", I am aware of the following about Instagram and about the information collected and retained by Instagram's owner, Facebook, Inc.;
- 36. Through the Instagram platform, Facebook, Inc. owns and operates a free-access social-networking website of the same name that can be accessed at http://www.instagram.com. Instagram allows users to create their own profile pages, which can include a short biography, a photo of themselves, and other information. Users can access Instagram through the Instagram website or by using a special electronic

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through a mobile device or tablet.

37. Instagram permits users to post photos to their profiles on Instagram and

application ("app") created by the company that allows users to access the service

- otherwise share photos with others on Instagram, as well as certain other social-media services, including Flickr, Facebook, and Twitter. When posting or sharing a photo on Instagram, a user can add to the photo, a caption; various "tags" that can be used to search for the photo (e.g., a user made add the tag #Chevy so that people interested in Chevrolet vehicles can search for and find the photo); location information; and other information. A user can also apply a variety of "filters" or other visual effects that modify the look of the posted photos. In addition, Instagram allows users to make comments on posted photos, including photos that the user posts or photos posted by other users of Instagram. Users can also "like" photos.
- 38. Facebook users may create an Instagram account directly through their Facebook account or they may create an Instagram account independently and then associate their Instagram account with their Facebook account. For these reasons, a particular user's Facebook profile and related account details are linked with a particular users Instagram account. This information is retained by Instagram (and Facebook).
- 39. Upon creating an Instagram account, an Instagram user must create a unique Instagram username and an account password. This information is collected and maintained by Instagram. Instagram also requests users to provide basic identity and contact information upon registration and also allows users to provide additional identity information for their user profile. This information may include the user's full name, email addresses, and phone numbers, as well as potentially other personal information provided directly by the user to Instagram. Once an account is created, users may also adjust various privacy and account settings for the account on Instagram. Instagram collects and maintains this information.
- 40. Instagram allows users to have "friends," which are other individuals with whom the user can share information without making the information public. Friends on

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Instagram may come from either contact lists maintained by the user, other third-party social media websites and information, or searches conducted by the user on Instagram profiles. Instagram collects and maintains this information.

- 41. Instagram also allows users to "follow" another user, which means that they receive updates about posts made by the other user. Users may also "unfollow" users, that is, stop following them or block the, which prevents the blocked user from following that user.
- 42. Instagram also allows users to post and share various types of user content, including photos, videos, captions, comments, and other materials. Instagram collects and maintains user content that users post to Instagram or share through Instagram.
- 43. Instagram users may send photos and videos to select individuals or groups via Instagram Direct. Information sent via Instagram Direct does not appear in a user's feed, search history, or profile.
- 44. Users on Instagram may also search Instagram for other users or particular types of photos or other content.
- 45. For each user, Instagram also collects and retains information, called "log file" information, every time a user requests access to Instagram, whether through a web page or through an app. Among the log file information that Instagram's servers automatically record is the particular web requests, any Internet Protocol ("IP) address associated with the request, type of browser used, any referring/exit web pages and associated URLs, pages viewed, dates and times of access, and other information.
- 46. Instagram also collects and maintains "cookies," which are small text files containing a string of numbers that are placed on a user's computer or mobile device and that allows Instagram to collect information about how a user uses Instagram. For example, Instagram uses cookies to help users navigate between pages efficiently, to remember preferences, and to ensure advertisements are relevant to a user's interests.
- 47. Instagram also collects information on the particular devices used to access Instagram. In particular, Instagram may record "device identifiers," which includes data

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files and other information that may identify the particular electronic device that was used to access Instagram.

- 48. Instagram also collects other data associated with user content. For example, Instagram collects any "hashtags" associated with user content (i.e., keywords used), "geotags" that mark the location of a photo and which may include GPS data such as latitude and longitude information, comments on photos, and other information.
- 49. Instagram also may communicate with the user, by email or otherwise. Instagram collects and maintains copies of communications between Instagram and the user.
- 50. On January 18, 2022, I served Instagram/Facebook, Inc. with a preservation request pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), requiring Instagram/Facebook, Inc. to preserve all information associated with the **SUBJECT ACCOUNT**.
- 51. As explained herein, information stored in connection with an Instagram account may provide crucial evidence of the "who, what, why, when, where, and how" of the criminal conduct under investigation, thus enabling investigators to establish and prove each element or alternatively, to exclude the innocent from further suspicion.
- 52. In my training and experience, an Instagram user's account activity, IP log, stored electronic communications, and other data retained by Instagram, can indicate who has used or controlled the Instagram account. This "user attribution" evidence is analogous to the search for "indicia of occupancy" while executing a search warrant at a residence. For example, profile contact information, direct messaging logs, shared photos and videos, and captions (and the data associated with the foregoing, such as geolocation, date and time) may be evidence of who used or controlled the Instagram account at a relevant time. Further, Instagram account activity can show how and when the account was accessed or used. For example, as described herein, Instagram logs the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from which users access their accounts along with the time and date. By determining the physical location associated with the logged IP addresses, investigators can understand the chronological and geographic context of the

account access and use relating to the crime under investigation. Such information allows investigators to understand the geographic and chronological context of Instagram access, use, and events relating to the crime under investigation.

- 53. Additionally, Instagram builds geo-location into some of its services. Geo-location allows, for example, users to "tag" their location in posts and Instagram "friends" to locate each other. This geographic and timeline information may tend to either inculpate or exculpate the Instagram account owner. Last, Instagram account activity may provide relevant insight into the Instagram account owner's state of mind as it relates to the offense under investigation. For example, information on the Instagram account may indicate the owner's motive and intent to commit a crime (e.g., information indicating a plan to commit a crime), or consciousness of guilt (e.g., deleting account information in an effort to conceal evidence from law enforcement).
- 54. Based on the information above, the computers of Instagram/Facebook, Inc. are likely to contain all the material described above with respect to the **SUBJECT ACCOUNT**, including stored electronic communications and information concerning subscribers and their use of Instagram, such as account access information, which would include information such as the IP addresses and devices used to access the account, as well as other account information that might be used to identify the actual user or users of the account at particular times.

BACKGROUND RELEVANT TO SOCIAL MEDIA & NARCOTICS

55. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals use social media services, such as Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, and similar sites, to post photographs and videos of themselves in possession of controlled substances, and to communicate with the public, their associates, and their adversaries. Communication can take form through pictures, videos, text, instant messaging, emojis, and etc. Also, many social media services utilize GPS and Wi-Fi connectivity to determine the location of the user. Users can also share their location with other users through these applications. Based on my training and experience, and particularly my familiarity with

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the Instagram social media platform, I know that drug traffickers can and often do use Instagram as a means of advertising controlled substances for sale and otherwise communicating with customers and suppliers about drug deals and other illegal activity

- I anticipate executing this warrant under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, in particular Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2703(a), (b)(1)(A), and (c)(1)(A), by using the warrant to require Instagram to disclose to the government copies of the records and other information (including the content of communications) particularly described in Section I of Attachment B. Upon receipt of the information described in Section I of Attachment B, government-authorized persons will review that information to locate the items described in Section II of Attachment B.
- Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law enforcement officer is not required for the service or execution of this warrant. The government will execute this warrant by serving it on Instagram.

REQUEST FOR SEALING

58. I further request that the Court order that all papers in support of this application, including the affidavit and search warrant, be sealed until further order of the Court. These documents discuss an ongoing criminal investigation that is neither public nor known to all of the targets of the investigation. Accordingly, there is good cause to seal these documents because their premature disclosure may give targets an opportunity to flee/continue flight from prosecution, destroy or tamper with evidence, change patterns of behavior, notify confederates, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation.

CONCLUSION

59. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that Andre JACKSON has unlawfully distributed and possessed with intent to distribute a controlled substance and engaged in alien smuggling in violation of 8 USC 1324. Agents believe that he has communicated about these offenses through his Instagram account, "itssdree_" (the SUBJECT ACCOUNT). Therefore, I believe that evidence of

JACKSON's unlawful drug trafficking activity and alien smuggling will be found in the SUBJECT ACCOUNT as further described in Attachments A. I seek authority for the government to search all of the items specified in Section I of Attachments B, in order to seize all of the data, documents and records that are identified in Section II of Attachment B.

- 60. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law enforcement officer is not required for the service or execution of this warrant. The government will execute this warrant by serving it on Instagram. Because the warrant will be served on Instagram, who will then compile the requested records at a time convenient to it, there exists reasonable cause to permit the execution of the requested warrant at any time in the day or night.
- 61. Based on the forgoing, I request that the Court issue the proposed search warrant.

Steven Meyer, Affiant Special Agent, DEA

The above-named agent provided a sworn statement attesting to the truth of the contents of the foregoing affidavit by telephone on the 31st day of January 2022.

J. RICHARD CREATURA
United States Magistrate Judge

Attachment A PROPERTY TO BE SEARCHED

This warrant applies to information associated with Instagram account "itssdree_" (active on, but not limited to, January 17, 2021), that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Facebook, Inc., a company headquartered at 1601 Willow Road, Menlo Park, California.

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ATTACHMENT B

(ITEMS TO BE SEARCHED AND SEIZED)

I. Information to be disclosed by Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook")

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of Facebook, regardless of whether such information is located within or outside of the United States, and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that has been deleted but is still available to Facebook, or has been preserved pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) on January 18, 2022, Facebook is required to disclose the following information to the government for each account or identifier listed in Attachment A:

- A. All business records and subscriber information, in any form kept, pertaining to the Account, including:
 - 1. Identity and contact information (past and current), including full name, e-mail addresses, physical address, date of birth, phone numbers, gender, hometown, occupation, websites, and other personal identifiers;
 - 2. All Instagram usernames (past and current) and the date and time each username was active, all associated Instagram and Facebook accounts (including those linked by machine cookie), and all records or other information about connections with Facebook, third-party websites, and mobile apps (whether active, expired, or removed);
 - 3. Length of service (including start date), types of services utilized, purchases, and means and sources of payment (including any credit card or bank account number) and billing records;
 - 4. Devices used to login to or access the account, including all device identifiers, attributes, user agent strings, and information about networks and connections, cookies, operating systems, and apps and web browsers;
 - 5. All advertising information, including advertising IDs, ad activity, and ad topic preferences;
 - 6. Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses used to create, login, and use the account, including associated dates, times, and port numbers, from January 1, 2021 to present;

- 7. Privacy and account settings, including change history; and
- 8. Communications between Facebook and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken;
- B. All content (whether created, uploaded, or shared by or with the Account), records, and other information relating to videos (including live videos and videos on IGTV), images, stories and archived stories, past and current bios and profiles, posts and archived posts, captions, tags, nametags, comments, mentions, likes, follows, followed hashtags, shares, invitations, and all associated logs and metadata, January 1, 2021 to present;
- C. All content, records, and other information relating to communications sent from or received by the Account January 1, 2021 to present;, including but not limited to:
 - 1. The content of all communications sent from or received by the Account, including direct and group messages, and all associated multimedia and metadata, including deleted and draft content if available;
 - 2. All records and other information about direct, group, and disappearing messages sent from or received by the Account, including dates and times, methods, sources and destinations (including usernames and account numbers), and status (such as delivered, opened, replayed, screenshot);
 - 3. All records and other information about group conversations and video chats, including dates and times, durations, invitations, and participants (including usernames, account numbers, and date and time of entry and exit); and
 - 4. All associated logs and metadata;
- D. All content, records, and other information relating to all other interactions between the Account and other Instagram users January 1, 2021 to present, including but not limited to:
 - 1. Interactions by other Instagram users with the Account or its content, including posts, comments, likes, tags, follows (including unfollows, approved and denied follow requests, and blocks and unblocks), shares, invitations, and mentions;
 - 2. All users the account has followed (including the close friends list), unfollowed, blocked, unblocked, muted, restricted, or denied a request to follow, and of users who have followed, unfollowed, blocked, unblocked, muted, restricted, or denied a request to follow the account;